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ARGUMENT 
THE COST ESTIMATE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL 
MEASURE UNDER RULE 407 AND IS THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE. 
I. 
The authorities that have considered the scope of Rule 
407 indicate it is quite narrow. Only when the policy on which 
the rule is founded is furthered should relevant evidence be 
excluded. Because a l l r e l e v a n t evidence I s admissi:^-.- u:, ^er 
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contained in Rule 407 is illustrative, not exhaustive. Id. at 
page 130. If a subsequent remedial measure is relevant to show 
anything other than negligence it comes in under the doctrine of 
multiple admissibility contained in Utah Rule of Evidence 105. 
At common law, the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures in a 
negligence action was required only when the evidence was offered 
to show a breach of an existing duty by a defendant. On the 
other hand, if the subsequent remedial measure was offered to 
show only the existence of a duty, it was admissible. As stated 
by Wright and Graham: 
Given the intent to preserve the common law, 
Rule 407 should also be read as not applying 
to proof of remedial measures where relevant 
to other elements of the negligence cause of 
action. 
Id. at pg. 122. Interestingly, the footnote included by Wright 
and Graham after this statement refers to the advisory committee 
note to the predecessor to Utah Rule of Evidence 407, Utah Rule 
of Evidence 51, which stated that: "This rule relates only to 
negligence and not to causation.11. 
The manner in which plaintiff sought to use the 
evidence of the cost estimate obtained by Wasatch Manor for 
installing a sprinkler system was not to show a breach of any 
duty by Wasatch Manor but was rather to demonstrate that 
installing such a sprinkler system in Wasatch Manor was feasible. 
The evidence related directly to demonstrating to a jury that a 
duty existed on the part of Wasatch Manor to install such a 
3 
sprinkler system given all the circumstances of the case. Under 
the authority cited above, use of that information to show that a 
duty existed on the part of Wasatch Manor does not violate the 
principles that underline Rule 407. As noted in the original 
brief, admission of this crucial bit of evidence is the best 
possible information available about whether installation of such 
a precautionary measure was feasible and should have been carried 
out by Wasatch Manor before the fire broke out at the high rise 
retirement home. 
III. THE COST ESTIMATE IS ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE THE FEASIBILITY OF 
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES BECAUSE FEASIBILITY HAS BEEN 
CONTROVERTED BY WASATCH MANOR. 
Wasatch Manor argues in its brief that on the one hand, 
feasibility has not been controverted and therefore under the 
language of Rule 407, the information on the cost estimate may 
not be admitted. However, it is clear from the stance it has 
taken in the case that Wasatch. Manor does contest feasibility. 
Wasatch Manor argues vigorously that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was properly granted because the appellant had not 
carried her burden to show "the cost of designing, constructing, 
and installing the sprinkler system." Brief of 
Defendant/Appellee, pp. 8. Either Wasatch Manor must concede 
that feasibility is not an issue and that the appellant has no 
responsibility as part of a prima facie case to establish the 
cost of designing, constructing, and installing a sprinkler 
system, in which case the issue concerning the cost estimate is 
4 
moot, or the appellee must dispute this, put the appellant to her 
proof, and controvert the issue of feasibility. Wasatch Manor 
has chosen to do the latter• It cannot now be heard to say that 
feasibility is uncontroverted. 
The reason for requiring that dispute exist before 
allowing introduction of subsequent remedial measures on 
feasibility is that: ". . . feasibility, unlike many other 
permissible uses, is an issue that exists in almost every case." 
Wright and Graham, supra, §5286, p. 133. As stated in footnote 
29 on pg. 133, "If this 'exception1 is permitted to be used when 
there is no real issue of feasibility, it would soon devour the 
rule." 
Wasatch Manor cites in support of its proposition that 
evidence of subsequent precautionary measures may be introduced 
only if feasibility is controverted the case of Werner v. Upjohn 
Co.. Inc.. 628 F.2d 848 (1980), cert.den., 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). 
Werner does in fact stand for the proposition cited by the 
defendant that unless feasibility is controverted by the non-
offering party, evidence of the subsequent remedial measure will 
not come in unless offered for some other acceptable purpose. 
However, the appellee in this case does not have any basis to 
claim that feasibility is uncontroverted. Werner is helpful to 
the appellant because it verifies that under F.R.E. 105 evidence 
that is inadmissible for one purpose may be admissible for 
another and that the usual solution for such a problem is to 
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IV. APPELLANT HAS NO BURDEN TO SHOW WASATCH MANOR'S ABILITY TO 
PAY FOR THF -r^T OF INSTALLING THE SPRINKLER SYSTEM. 
Aithouqr. * 'u appellee adamantly maintains that as part 
of a prima facip o^f« ^ t > ~« .' ,^ncr the appellant must show that 
Wasar..i it .1 ] ] :i 1 1 ::j the 
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by the plaintiff, but that it is in the nature of the defense, 
rather than a part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Wasatch 
Manor may very well be correct when as it argues in its brief 
that this is a classic example of a risk/benefit analysis. But 
it is also clear under the case law cited by the appellant in her 
primary brief that the question of whether a legal duty exists 
under all the facts is left in the hands of the jury. Sufficient 
evidence has been presented to show Wasatch Manor breached its 
duty by not installing a sprinkler system in the building. 
Whether such a breach occurred is something that must be decided 
by the ultimate fact finder in the case, the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The cost estimate of putting a sprinkler system into 
Wasatch Manor is admissible evidence under the Rules of Evidence 
and specifically under Rule 407. In addition, the appellant has 
no burden to show that Wasatch Manor was able to pay for the cost 
of installing a sprinkler system. The order of the trial court 
granting Summary Judgment to the defendant should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial before a jury. 
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